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The Medicaid program, which provides health insurance coverage to low
income women and children, has expanded dramatically over the past de-
cade. This expansion provides a "natural laboratory" for learning about
the effect of public health insurance eligibility on insurance coverage,
health care utilization, and health outcomes. This paper provides an over-
view of what has been learned about these questions from studying the
expansions. Medicaid eligibility rose steeply over the 1984-1992 period,
but coverage rose much less sharply, due to limited takeup of benefits.
This is partly due to the fact that many eligibles already had private insur-
ance coverage, and evidence suggests that a large share of new enrollees
dropped their private coverage to join the program. Nevertheless, utiliza-
tion of preventive care rose substantially as a result of the expansions, and
there were significant improvements in health outcomes, specifically in-
fant and child mortality. While these mortality reductions came at signifi-
cant cost to the Medicaid program, the cost per life saved was low relative
This paper draws heavily on research that I have completed jointly with Janet Currie and
David Cutler; I am indebted to both of them for their insights during the course of these
joint projects. I am also grateful to Jim Poterba, whose comments motivated this undertak-
ing, and to the National Institute of Aging for financial support.170Gruber
to alternative uses of government funds. These findingshighlight both
the potential benefits of public insurance policy and the importanceof
appropriately targeting scarce public health dollars.
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States is alone among major industrialized nations in not hav-
ing a universal guarantee of insurance coverage for its citizens. As aresult,
over 40 million Americans are currently uninsured(Employee Benefits Re-
search Institute, 1995). But this large uncovered population should not be
taken to indicate that the U.S. government does not intervene in the mar-
ket for health insurance to help those unable to obtain coverage. On the
contrary, the single fastest growing federal entitlement program overthe
past decade is the Medicaid program, which provides health insurance cov-
erage for low income populations. In 1984, federalMedicaid expenditures
were $20.1 billion, which was only 2.2% of thefederal budget; by 1994, ex-
penditures are projected to have grown by almost 500%, encompassing
5.6% of the federal budget. But, over this same period, the number of per-
sons without insurance has grown by almost 20%
1
The fact that this rapid growth in the Medicaid program has not
checked the growth in the uninsured highlights the limitations of cur-
rent public insurance policy as a means of guaranteeing universal access
to the health care system. However, with universal coverageeffectively
erased from the policy horizon, partial solutions to the access problem
such as the Medicaid program are likely to be the alternative of choicefor
dealing with this problem in the near future. It is therefore important to
understand how this program affects the access to medical care and
health outcomes of the low income population in the U.S., and how
precious Medicaid dollars should be spent most efficiently in delivering
care to the underserved.
In fact, our understanding of the effects of the Medicaid program has
improved substantilly over the past five years. This improvement has
been the direct result of a number of dramatic shifts in Medicaid policy
towards pregnant women and children, both at the state and federal
level, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These substantial shocks to
the policy environment have created a "natural laboratory" for trying to
understand the costs and benefits of the Medicaid program for these
populations, and a large number of papers since the early 1990s have
'Data on Medicaid spending from U.S. Congress Committee on Ways and Means (1994);
data on budget from Economic Report of the President (1995); data on insurance coverage from
Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) (1995).Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children171
exploited the availability of this changing policy environment to draw
provocative conclusions about the impact of the Medicaid program. This
impressive accumulation of data on the performance of the Medicaid
program can provide the basis for thinking about health policy towards
the indigent in the coming years.
The purpose of this paper is to critically survey the recent literature on
Medicaid, with an eye towards the policy lessons that we have learned,
and the questions that remain unanswered. I begin by providing a brief
overview of the evolution of recent Medicaid policy in Part 2. At this
stage, I also outline the process by which legislated changes in Medicaid
eligibility can be traced through to the outcomes of ultimate interest,
health improvements and program cost increases. In Part 3, I describe
the increases in eligibility that resulted from the expansions, and discuss
the extent to which this eligibility has been translated to increased insur-
ance coverage, through the takeup of Medicaid by eligibles. In this con-
text, I highlight the potential for the "crowdout" of private insurance
coverage by Medicaid, and review evidence on the magnitude of this
crowdout effect. In Part 4, I discuss the critical question of what impact
Medicaid policy has had on the medical utilization and health status of
the poor. In particular, I contrast the costs and benefits of different types
of interventions that we have experienced over this period. In Part 5, I
turn to the other areas in which Medicaid has had important effects. Part




At the outset, it is important to highlight that Medicaid is a program that
serves three distinct populations: low income women and children; the
low income disabled; and the low income elderly, and in particular
nursing home residents. Spending is split roughly evenly between these
three groups. In this paper, I will focus on the first of these groups,
women and children. This focus is dictated by three considerations.
First, the eligibility of low income women and children is the part of the
program that has undergone the most radical change over this time
period. Second, and related, this is the part of the program that has been
the subject of the most study by economists.2 Finally, if Medicaid is cut
2Indeed, the other aspects of the program have been virtually ignored by the research
community; for a recent exception, see Yelowitz (1996). This is unfortunate given their
fiscal importance.172Gruber
back, this is the population which may see the largest reductions in
eligibility.
Historically, Medicaid eligibility for women and children has been tied
to participation in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram (AFDC). This linkage to AFDC greatly restricted access to the
Medicaid program. Despite the existence of the AFDCUnemployed
Parents program (AFDCUP), which provides benefits to households in
which the primary earner is unemployed, AFDC benefits are generally
available only to single-parent households.3 Moreover, income cutoffs
for cash welfare vary across states, and can be very low. For example, in
1984, the cutoff for a family of 4 in South Carolina was only 29% of the
poverty line.
There were a number of other programs offered at the discretion of the
states, under which poor women and children could qualify for Medic-
aid, including the Medically Needy program (which allowed families to
qualify for Medicaid if their incomes were somewhat above the cutoff
but their medical expenses were particularly high); the Ribicoff Children
program (which allowed states to cover children in two-parent families
who met the AFDC income criteria); and other special options to cover
women without children who met the AFDC income criteria for the
expenses of their pregnancy only. While these options relaxed the family
structure restrictions for the Medicaid program in some cases, eligibility
was still restricted only to very poor persons.
Beginning in 1984, however, the Medicaid program began to expand
eligibility for all children, and for pregnant women; that is, for women,
these expansions applied only to the expenses of pregnancy. Changes in
Medicaid policy since 1984 can be broadly categorized into two eras. The
first, from 1984mid-1987, was a period of incremental increases in Med-
icaid eligibility for populations that had similar financial circumstances
to AFDC families, but who did not meet the eligibility criterion for other
reasons. This began a gradual weakening of the linkage between AFDC
coverage and eligibility for Medicaid. This occurred both at the state
level, for example through expansions of the Ribicoff program option,
and at the federal level, through the 1984 DEFRA and 1985 COBRA
legislations. Table 1 summarizes the federal legislation of this era.
Many states did not have an AFDCUP program until all were mandated to include them
in 1991; among those that did, eligibility requirements were strict. As a result, as of 1990
only 5% of the AFDC caseload qualified under this program (U.S. Congress, Committee on
Ways and Means, 1994).
In 1984, only 23 states offered the Ribicoff Children program; by 1987, this had expanded
to 32 states, although some states limited eligibility to somewhat younger children (less
than age 17, 18, or 19, instead of the traditional cutoff of age 21).Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children173
TABLE 1
The Medicaid Expansions
Deficit Reduction Act, 1984: Effective October 1, 1984. Required statesto ex-
tend Medicaid coverage to children born after September 30, 1983, if those chil-
dren lived in families that were income-eligible for AFDC. Mandatorycoverage
of pregnant women by AFDC if those women would be eligibleonce the child
was born. Mandatory coverage of pregnant women under the AFDC-UP pro-
gram, even if the state did not have such a program for all groups.
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, 1985: Effective July, 1986. Pregnant
women who meet AFDC resource standards are eligible for Medicaid regard-
less of family structure.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986: Effective April 1, 1987. Permitted
states to extend Medicaid coverage to pregnant women and children in families
with incomes below the federal poverty level. Beginning in fiscalyear 1988,
states could increase the age cutoff by one year each year, until all children
under age five were covered.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1987: Effective July 1, 1988. Permitted
states to cover children under age 2, 3, 4, or 5 who were born after September
30, 1983. Effective October 1, 1988, states could expand coverage to children
under age 8 born after September 30, 1983. Allowed states to extend Medicaid
eligibility to pregnant women and to infants up to one year ofage in families
with incomes up to 185% of the federal poverty level. Stateswere required to
cover children through age 5 in fiscal year 1989 and through age 6 in fiscal year
1990, if the families met AFDC income standards.
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 1988: Effective July 1, 1989. Required
states to cover pregnant women and infants up to age 1 in families with in-
comes less than 75% of the federal poverty level. Effective July 1, 1990, the
income threshold was raised to 100% of poverty.
Family Support Act, 1988: Effective April 1, 1990. Required states to continue
Medicaid coverage for 12 months among families who had received AFDC in
three of the previous six months, but who had become ineligible because of
earnings.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1989: Effective April 1, 1990. Required
states to extend Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women and childrenup to age
6 with family incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty line.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1990: Effective July 1, 1991. Required
states to cover all children under age 19 who were born after September 30,
1983 and whose family incomes were below 100% of the federal poverty level.174Gruber
The second era, from mid-1987 to the present, saw a moredramatic
decoupling of Medicaid and AFDC through substantial increases inthe
income cutoff for Medicaid eligibility. These expansionssubstantially
increased (in most states) the income that a family could have andstill
qualify for Medicaid, while providing these higher eligibility levels toall
family structures, not just to single parent families. By 1992, states were
required to cover all pregnant women and children under the ageof 6 up
to 133% of poverty (independent of familycomposition), and were al-
lowed to expand coverage up to 185% of poverty.5 In addition,children
born after September 30, 1983, were mandatorily covered up to100% of
poverty (once again, independent of familycomposition).
While most of the legislative action over this period was at thefederal
level, there was tremendous heterogeneity in the impacts ofMedicaid
policy changes across the states. States initially had differentqualifica-
tion limits through AFDC and other optional programs (such asRibicoff
Children), and they took up the new options at different rates, sothat
there was a great deal of variation across states in boththe size and
timing of the expansions. There was also variation within statesin the
eligibility of children of different ages for the Medicaid expansions,due
to different age thresholds in the laws. This variationis illustrated in
Table 2, from Yelowitz (1995a). This shows the age and percentof pov-
erty cutoffs for expansions to the youngest groupof children in each
state at three different points in time.6 In January, 1988,only some states
had expanded eligibility, and the income and age cutoffsvaried. By
December, 1989, all states had some expansion in place sincefederal law
mandated coverage of infants up to 75% of the poverty line; but some
states had expanded coverage up to age 7 or 8,and coverage ranged as
high as 185% of the poverty line. By December, 1991, statepolicies were
more uniform as the most restrictivefederal mandates had taken place,
but some variation in poverty cutoffs remained.
2.2 How Does Medicaid Affect Health?
Ultimately, the question of interest for policy makers is how thesepolicy
changes impacted the health of the low income population,and at what
cost. To understand the effects of Medicaid policy onhealth, however, it
is important to trace through the channels bywhich changes at the
Several states expanded coverage above 185% of poverty, but they did not receivefederal
matching funds for those enrolled.
6 There were also differential expansions to older children as well, adding further richness
to the variation in legislation across the states. The age restrictions werecouched either in
terms of date of birth, calendar date, or both, giving rise to thefractional ages of eligibility
in some states at a given point in time.Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children175
legislative level are translated to actual health improvements. In this
section I provide a brief overview of these channels; in the remainder of
the paper, I review what we know about each of them.
The process by which Medicaid determines health is depicted in
Chart 1. The first step in evaluating the effect of Medicaid policy changes
on outcomes of interest, such as health, is to examine the effects on the
eligibility of persons for the Medicaid program. While these expansions
clearly increased eligibility, the extent to which they did so is hard to
state ex ante, given the fact that the cutoffs for different age groups are
moving through different parts of the income distribution. Thus, it is
important to assess the ex post effect of these policy prescriptions on the
share of the population actually made eligible for the Medicaid program.
The next step is the translation of Medicaid eligibility into Medicaid
coverage. An important general feature of social insurance programs is
that individuals do not always take up the benefits for which theyare
eligible. For example, Blank and Card (1991) estimate that takeup of
unemployment insurance benefits only about ¼, and Blank and Ruggles
(1996) find similar takeup rates for the AFDC and Food Stamps pro-
grams. Thus, only some of the previously uninsured wifi take up the
benefits for which they are entitled.
The previously uninsured are not the only group which takesup
benefits, however. In fact, the majority of those made eligible for the
expansions actually had private insurance already. Some of those indi-
viduals wifi find it attractive to drop that private insurance and join the
Medicaid program; the incentives for and magnitudes of this "crowd-
out" of private insurance are described below.
Moreover, once covered by Medicaid, individuals will not automati-
cally increase their utilization of medical care. Many physicians do not
treat publicly insured patients possibly because public insurance pro-
grams generally reimburse at rates far below private fee levels. A number
of observers have alleged that there is a shortfall in the supply of physi-
cians willing to serve Medicaid patients. The American Medical Asso-
ciation (1991) reports that 26% of physicians described themselves as
"nonparticipants" in the Medicaid program, and only 34% reported that
they participated "fully" and were accepting new Medicaid patients. This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the patients who would be
made eligible for public insurance are concentrated in areas that are un-
derserved by physicians (Fossett and Peterson, 1989; Fossett et al., 1992).7
For example, Fossett et al. (1992) compared Chicago neighborhoods with 50% of the popu-
lation on welfare to neighborhoods with 10% of the population on welfare and found that






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Program Costs Health Outcomes
Cost Effectiveness
CHART 1 Medicaid Eligibility PolicyHealth Insurance for Poor Women and Children179
Finally, increases in the utilization of care will not necessarily improve
child healthfor example, a number of studies suggest that much of the
acute care received by children is inappropriate and may have little
health benefit.8 Lurie et al. (1984) and Bindman et al. (1990) document
positive effects of insurance on adult health, but a randomized trial
(Newhouse, 1993) suggested that increasing the generosity of insurance
coverage had little health benefit. Moreover, much of the discussion of
Medicaid policy has focused on the insurance coverage of children. But
neither of the first two studies looked at children, and therewere too
few children involved in the randomized trial for any firm conclusion
regarding child health to be drawn (Valdez, 1985). Many economists
(e.g., Fuchs, 1974) emphasize that medical care may actually be of lim-
ited relevance for health, relative to the other behavioral and environ-
mental factors impacting on the health of low income persons.
Whether or not increases in utilization improve health outcomes,
there is a definite link between increased utilization and increases in
Medicaid program costs. Thus, the final step in assessing the efficacy of
Medicaid policy is to compare the costs of utilization increases toany
health benefits, to compute the cost effectiveness of eligibility increases.
Below, I present direct evidence on cost effectiveness, as measured by
the cost per life saved under the Medicaid program.
3. ELIGIBILITY AND COVERAGE
3.1 Effects on Eligibility
As noted above, the first step in tracing out the effect of the expansions
is to measure the impact on eligibility. I measure eligibility for Medicaid
using data from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) for 1985
through 1993. Since the CPS asks about insurance and income witha
one year lag, the data are for 1984 through 1992. To use these data, I
have developed detailed simulation programs which model the Medic-
aid eligibility of women of child-bearing age and of children in each state
and year.9 These programs input data on a family's income and family
structure, run these data through a module which describes Medicaid
policy as a function of these variables in each state and year, and output
Medicaid eligibility for each member of that family. Since the CPS does
8Kemper (1988), for example, finds that 21% of pediatric hospitalization days were of
"doubtful necessity," and that this fraction is higher for insured than for uninsured
children.
These programs were developed in collaboration with Janet Currie, and are described in
more detail in Currie and Gruber (1996a,b). Aaron Yelowitz also provided extensive assis-





% of Women eligible
% of Children eligible
FIGURE 1: Medicaid Eligibility of Women and Children
not indicate whether a woman is pregnant, eligibility isimputed for all
women of child-bearing age (15-44).
The results of applying the Medicaid rules to the CPS data are pre-
sented in Figure 1, for women age 15-44 and for children under age 15; it
is important to keep in mind that Figure 1 refers to eligibilityfor the
expenses of pregnancy only. For both groups,there is a gradual increase
in eligibility from 1984 through 1987, and a much morerapid increase
thereafter; these correspond to the two eras denoted above. By 1992,
almost one-half of all women were eligible for Medicaid for the expenses
of pregnancy, and almost one-third of children age 0-14 wereeligible for
all of their medical spending.
These national trends mask considerable heterogeneity acrossthe
states. In Table 3, I show the changes in eligibility for each state overthis
period, for children and for women. In the first column of each panel, I
present the level of eligibility for 1984, in the second thelevel of eligibil-
ity in 1992, and in the third the difference between the two.While there
are clearly large increases in eligibility on average,the differences across
the states are striking. For pregnant women, the increase in eligibility
ranged from a low of 4% in Utah to a high of 43% in Texas. For children,
there was actually a decline in eligibility of 4% in Wisconsin, and a rise of
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State 1984 1992 Diff State 1984 1992 Diff
AL 0.111 0.252 0.141 AL 0.150 0.528 0.378
AK 0.179 0.208 0.029 AK 0.193 0.306 0.114
AR 0.163 0.292 0.129 AR 0.129 0.453 0.324
CA 0.294 0.406 0.112 CA 0.262 0.510 0.248
CO 0.073 0.211 0.138 CO 0.116 0.379 0.264
CT 0.122 0.273 0.151 CT 0.140 0.341 0.171
DE 0.133 0.198 0.065 DE 0.057 0.373 0.316
DC 0.427 0.474 0.047 DC 0.333 0.494 0.162
FL 0.116 0.337 0.221 FL 0.127 0.492 0.364
GA 0.120 0.327 0.207 GA 0.121 0.393 0.272
HI 0.126 0.278 0.152 HI 0.205 0.372 0.167
ID 0.065 0.292 0.227 ID 0.115 0.456 0.341
IL 0.204 0.287 0.083 IL 0.193 0.358 0.164
IN 0.089 0.272 0.183 IN 0.050 0.423 0.373
IA 0.206 0.266 0.060 IA 0.233 0.494 0.261
KS 0.065 0.190 0.125 KS 0.124 0.319 0.195
KY 0.117 0.330 0.213 KY 0.108 0.518 0.409
LA 0.106 0.357 0.251 LA 0.142 0.505 0.363
ME 0.165 0.335 0.170 ME 0.153 0.518 0.365
MD 0.114 0.317 0.203 MD 0.115 0.370 0.256
MA 0.152 0.259 0.107 MA 0.169 0.381 0.213
MI 0.261 0.283 0.022 MT 0.222 0.441 0.219
MN 0.143 0.325 0.182 MN 0.108 0.440 0.333
MS 0.154 0.380 0.226 MS 0.167 0.595 0.429
MO 0.116 0.329 0.213 MO 0.106 0.389 0.282
MT 0.055 0.233 0.178 MT 0.127 0.380 0.253
NE 0.170 0.221 0.051 NE 0.161 0.303 0.142
NV 0.056 0.261 0.205 NV 0.051 0.381 0.330
NH 0.061 0.167 0.106 NH 0.030 0.295 0.265
NJ 0.164 0.223 0.059 NJ 0.177 0.422 0.245
NM 0.088 0.318 0.230 NM 0.120 0.540 0.419
NY 0.286 0.491 0.205 NY 0.281 0.489 0.208
NC 0.068 0.299 0.231 NC 0.122 0.491 0.368
ND 0.168 0.223 0.055 ND 0.138 0.369 0.231
OH 0.173 0.267 0.094 OH 0.163 0.336 0.173
OK 0.153 0.334 0.181 OK 0.128 0.449 0.321
OR 0.060 0.243 0.183 OR 0.040 0.313 0.272
PA 0.223 0.218 -0.005 PA 0.219 0.336 0.117
RI 0.194 0.292 0.098 RI 0.179 0.475 0.296
SC 0.079 0.335 0.256 SC 0.117 0.544 0.427
SD 0.050 0.227 0.177 SD 0.107 0.337 0.231
TN 0.095 0.321 0.226 TN 0.110 0.500 0.390Note: Figures are fraction of children and women eligible for Medicaid in each state year, based on
author's calculations.
states in the rate at which children of different ages were covered. For
example, coverage of children under age 3 rose by over 30% in Texas,
while coverage of children over age 10 rose by less than 5%.
3.2 Effects on Coverage
The findings of Part 2 suggest a dramatic increase in the eligibility of
both (pregnant) women and children for the Medicaid program. But, as
highlighted earlier, this does not automatically translate into increased
coverage by the Medicaid program. In fact, takeup problems arelikely to
be even larger for the Medicaid expansions, relative to other social insur-
ance programs, due to the nature of the population that isbeing newly
covered. This point is highlighted in Table 4. This table presents data for
the 1984 population of children and women age 15-44. I divide this
population into three groups: those eligible for Medicaid in 1984; those
who were not eligible in 1984, but who would be eligible by 1992 rules;
and those who would not be eligible by 1992 rules. When I project future
eligibility, I inflate 1984 incomes to 1992 levels using the CPI.
Table 4 shows two reasons why we might expect relatively low
takeup of the Medicaid expansions. First, the population covered by the
expansions was much less disadvantaged than was the population al-
ready eligible for Medicaid at the start of the period. Most importantly,
they were relatively unlikely to be receiving public assistance through
AFDC. Limited contacts with the social welfare system may make these
persons unaware of the benefits for which they were newlyentitled.
Second, much of the population that was covered by the expansions





State 1984 1992 Diff State 1984 1992 Diff
TX 0.069 0.348 0.279 TX 0.053 0.485 0.432
UT 0.146 0.236 0.090 UT 0.260 0.302 0.043
VT 0.192 0.356 0.164 VT 0.242 0.485 0.243
VA 0.090 0.218 0.128 VA 0.053 0.298 0.245
WA 0.126 0.246 0.120 WA 0.141 0.294 0.154
WV 0.104 0.353 0.249 WV 0.157 0.527 0.370
WI 0.266 0.218 -0.048 WI 0.267 0.337 0.070
WY 0.055 0.224 0.169 WY 0.103 0.335 0.232Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children183
TABLE 4
Characteristics of Medicaid Eligibles
eligible for Medicaid. Indeed, two-thirds of those made eligible for Medic-
aid already had private insurance coverage. Thus, the demand for tak-
ing up Medicaid may be much lower, even conditional on being aware
of one's eligibffity.
In fact, previous research documents quite low takeup rates for Medic-
aid. Cutler and Gruber (1996a), for example, find a takeup rate of only
23% for children; Curne and Gruber (1996a,b) estimate takeup rates of
23% for children and 34% for women of child-bearing age. This finding
suggests that there is only weak translation of the tremendous eligibility
expansions into Medicaid coverage, a fact that is confirmed by Figure 2,
which shows time series data on coverage for children and women of
child-bearing age. While both series rise steeply, the increase is much
less than that of eligibility; moreover, much of the rise after 1989 is due
to the recession, not due to eligibility policy.
3.3 Medicaid and Crowdout
The fact that such a large share of the newly eligible population under
the Medicaid expansions had access to private insurance raises the pros-
pect that many of the new enrollees on the program may have been
"crowded out" of private insurance purchases. The crowdout of private













Female headed 63% 30% 13%
Head is high school dropout 45% 25% 12%
Head works 51% 88% 95%
Family in poverty 79% 19% 2%
Mean family income $10276 $18517 $38263
Family receives AFDC 47% 5% 1%
Insurance coverage
Private 23% 69% 88%
Public 52% 7% 2%








% of Children Covered
% of Women Covered
I I I
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Year
FIGURE 2: Medicaid Coverage of Women and Children
long literature, but the first paper to specifically consider the interaction
of private and public health insurance was Cutler and Gruber (1996a).
That paper begins by discussing the extent to which we might anticipate
crowdout. Crowdout will occur to the extent that some individuals who
are made eligible already have private insurance (as was demonstrated
to be the case in Table 4), and to the extent that those individuals find
Medicaid a more attractive option. Along some dimensions, Medicaid is
a much more generous plan than most private policies,since it has no
copayments, covers prescription drugs, and often covers optional ser-
vices such as dental care. In contrast, under the typical private insurance
policy individuals pay one-third of their total medical costs out of
pocket, in the form of copayments, deductibles, and premium-sharing.
For many reasons, however, the value of Medicaid is below that of
private policies. Because of low Medicaid reimbursement rates, provid-
ers are often reluctant to treat Medicaid patients (Currie, Gruber, and
Fischer, 1995), thus reducing the value of coverage. In addition, individu-
als may not want to be enrolled in public programs, because of the
stigma associated with public programs or the difficulty in enrolling.









Note: Based on March CPS Surveys for 1988 through 1993.
FIGURE 3: Health Insurance Coverage of Children
difficulty shifting from Medicaid back into privatecoverage if they have
preexisting medical conditions. Thus, the extent to which the newly
Medicaid-eligible population would drop their privatecoverage to obtain
medicaid coverage is an empirical question.
The time series evidence on insurancecoverage in the U.S. would
seem to confirm the crowdout hypothesis; there is a remarkable time
series correlation between Medicaid coverage and private insurancecov-
erage over this period. Figure 3 documents this correlation for children.
The time series movements in Medicaid and private insurance mirror
each other; as a result, there was little change in the number of children
uninsured. However, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from this
evidence because the recession during this time period wouldcause






both private insurance to fall and Medicaid enrollment to grow, evenin
the absence of crowdout.
The approach used by Cutler and Gruber is therefore to exploit the
tremendous variation in Medicaid eligibility across states, within states
over time, and even within states at a pointin time (from age notches in
eligibility). They use the CPS data and eligibility imputations described
above to estimate models of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on private
insurance coverage over the 1987-1992 period. A keyfeature of this
paper is the recognition that there may bewithin-family spillovers in insur-
ance coverage decisions. That is, it maybe inappropriate to model a
child's private insurance coverage as a function of that child's eligibility
only. This is because private health insurance is generally sold only for
individuals or families, without gradations among types of dependents.
Thus, a family that wants to cover both parents but not the children
(because the children may qualify for Medicaid) may find it impossible to
do so with only one policy. Similarly, there is often no savings from
enrolling some dependents on a policy but not others. This lack of dis-
tinction among dependents may increase or decrease the amountof
crowdout. To the extent that families value coverage of all members and
some members cannot qualify for public coverage,crowdout is likely to
be smaller than an individual-by-individual calculation would suggest.
On the other hand, if the Medicaid subsidy is large, families may drop
coverage of all members, even those who do notqualify for public insur-
ance directly. In either case, accountingfor within-family spillovers is
key.1°
Cutler and Gruber account for the effect of Medicaid eligibility on the
family's insurance coverage decisions by modeling each family mem-
ber's insurance coverage as a function of the "Medicaid replacement
rate": the share of expected family medical spending that is madeeligible
for Medicaid. The results of this exercise are summarized inTable 5,
from Cutler and Gruber (1996a). They estimate that the Medicaid expan-
sions brought 1.5 million children and 700,000 women onto theMedicaid
rolls. At the same time, they were responsible for 600,000children,
800,000 women, and 300,000 other family members dropping theirpri-
vate insurance coverage in order to take advantageof free Medicaid
10A similar argument might suggest that there might also be within-firm spifiovers,
through the decisions of employers to stop offering insurance when much of their
workplace was Medicaid eligible. Cutler and Gruber find no evidence of an effect of
Medicaid eligibility on employer decisions to offer insurance, however; all of thecrowdout
effect appears to come through employee takeup decisions. At the same time, theyfind
some suggestive evidence that employers are increasingpremium-sharing in response to
the expansions, in order to induce lower takeup of workplace coverage and a shift to the
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TABLE 5
Effect of Medicaid Expansions on Insurance Coverage
Children 1.5 -0.6
Women 15-44 0.7 -0.8
Other adults - -0.3
Total 2.2 -1.7
(-77%)
Conditional coverage of women 0.9 -
Conditional coverage of children 0.4 -
Total 3.5 -1.7
(-49%)
Note: Shows change in Medicaid and private coverage of women and children due to the expansions.
Each cell is number of persons (in millions). From Cutler and Gruber (1996a).
coverage. The greater than 100% crowdout for women, and the effect on
other family members, is a by-product of within-family spilovers.
But the estimated increase in the Medicaid rolls is an underestimate of
the true increase in the availability of Medicaid to these populations. The
Medicaid expansions explicitly did not give continuouscoverage to
women. Rather, they created a form of conditional coveragewomen
are covered, but only for some expenses. As a result, women who are
eligible for Medicaid in the event of pregnancy but who report them-
selves to be uninsured actually have some partial (conditional) insurance
coverage. In particular, these women will have their hospital bifis for
delivery covered, since hospitals have developed detailed systems to
insure that uninsured persons who are eligible for Medicaid get signed
up for the program.
In the same vein, Medicaid also provides a form of conditionalcoverage
for uninsured children. The fact that these childrenare not continuously
covered by Medicaid suggests that they are not availing themselves of the
insurance for the purpose of their primary medical care. Once again,
however, when these children need hospital services, theymay be signed
up for Medicaid, so that they have conditional coverage for their hospital
spending.
Cutler and Gruber value conditional coverage for womenas the share
of average annual medical spending that is accounted for by hospital
expenses for pregnancy (25%), and for children as the share of annual
total spending that is at the hospital (44%). Doing so, shown in the next
set of rows in Table 5, increases the estimated coverage increase to 3.5
Change in coverage (millions)
Coverage of: Medicaid Private188Gruber
million peop1Accounting fcr ccrnditional coverage, the bottom line
estimate is that 0% of the increae in Medicaid eligibility wasassociated
with a reductiOi itt private insurance coverage.
This is a sizable effect, suggesting the importance of this issuefor
Medicaid policy design. Nevertheless, these results also suggest that at
least half of those enrolling in Medicaid were previouslyuninsured, so
that there was a large net improvement in health insurance coveragein
the U.S. as a result of the expansions.11
4. EFFECTS ON UTILIZATION OF HEALTHCARE AND
HEALTH OUTCOMES
A natural motivation for increasing the eligibility of the low income popu-
lation for public insurance is to improve their health. But, ashighlighted
above, there are a number of reasons why increased healthinsurance
does not guarantee improved health outcomes. Thus, simplydocument-
ing that the Medicaid expansions increased insurance coverageis not
enough to prove that they improved health. In this section, I therefore
review studies which focus directly on the effects of the expansions on
health care utilization and health outcomes. These studies focus in par-
ticular on use of preventative care and on directly measurable outcomes
such as mortality and fetal health (Le.-,_low_birthweight)
12
4.1 Observational Analyses
A number of studies have assessed the effects of Medicaidby comparing
the utilization and health of persons with Medicaid coverage, relative to
the uninsured. These studies have shown that uninsured personshave
lower utilization levels, a less efficient distribution of utilization across
sites of care, and worse health outcomes (e.g., Kasper,1986; Short and
11Cutler and Gruber (1996b) estimate that in fact as much as 80% of the newly enrolled
Medicaid population was previously uninsured. The difference between the 50%and 80%
figures is the population that dropped private insurance due to the expansions, butdidn't
enroll in Medicaid (e.g., women who are waiting for pregnancy to enroll). SinceCutler and
Gruber (1996a), several further studies have estimated the crowdout of private insurance
by Medicaid. Rask and Rask (1995) and Currie (1996) also foundsubstantial crowdout.
Dubay and Kenney (1996) find smaller crowdout overall, but similar effects for those above
the poverty line; for a comparison of those results to Cutler and Gruber (1996a), seeCutler
and Gruber (1996c).
12This focus is dictated by the empirical difficulties with using measuresof acute care
(since, if Medicaid affects health, it will have a feedback effect on use of acutecare) and
self-reported health (since increased contacts with the medical system may worsen percep-
tions of health through improved medical information). See Currie and Gruber(1996b) for
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Lefkowitz, 1992; Mullahy, 1994). But since the uninsuredare likely to
differ from the insured in both observable and unobservable respects, it
is difficult to draw causal inferences from these types of comparisons.
Furthermore, insurance coverage itself may be a function of health sta-
tus, leading to endogeneity bias in estimates of the effects of insurance
on health and on the utilization of medical care.
4.2 Pre -Post Analyses
A natural alternative approach to analyzing the effect of Medicaidon
utilization and health is to contrast the experience ofa single state before
and after it expands its Medicaid program. This approach has been the
focus of two important studies of prenatal care use and infant outcomes,
Piper et al. (1990) and Haas et al. (1993a).13 Piper analyzed the effect of
the extension of Medicaid coverage to low income marriedwomen in
Tennessee in 1985; Haas et al. examined the effect of expanding Medic-
aid coverage to women with incomes under 185% of the poverty line in
Massachusetts in 1985.14
Both of these studies have a common finding: there was no effect of
insurance expansions on either use of prenatal care or infant outcomes.
Piper et al. suggest one reason for this finding: more than two-thirds of
the women who were eligible for Medicaid enrolled after the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy; almost 30% enrolled in the last 30 days before birth.15
The extent of late enrollment grew after the expansion of Medicaid,
suggesting that the newly eligible were enrolling even later. Ellwood
and Kenney (1995) use more recent data to refute this contention, how-
ever, finding that, among women who were newly enrolled for their
pregnancy, the expansion population was as successful as the AFDC
population in enrolling the first trimester. Even in the Ellwood and
Kenney data, however, only about one-half of the newly enrolling
women were enrolled during the first trimester. A large literature on the
effectiveness of prenatal care suggests that it is receipt of care in the first
trimester that is key for improving fetal health (Institute of Medicine,
1985). Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was no effect on out-
comes of these expansions.
13 J am aware of no such studies focusingon children.
14 The Massachusetts expansion was not technically a Medicaid policy, but rathera state-
only program for the uninsured; but it foreshadowed the expansions that would be imple-
mented under the Medicaid programs several years later.
15 Howell and Ellwood (1991) study this question foran earlier period (1983), and they find
that roughly 50-60% of women whose deliveries were paid for by Medicaid were enrolled
in Medicaid in the first trimester.190Gruber
While informative, these studies suffer from two potentially important
problems. First, they are unable to control for correlated time series
trends in the use of prenatal care and birth outcomes. There are a num-
ber of other changes in the circumstances of low income households in
the 1980s which might lead to lower use of prenatal care or worse out-
comes, such as the erosion of the real earnings of low wage earners(Katz
and Murphy, 1992). These could interfere with uncovering the true ef-
fect of the Medicaid expansions. Second, the experience of one state's
program may not be broadly prescriptive for the effects ofnational Med-
icaid policy.
4.3 Combining the StatesMethodology
An alternative approach involves using the experience of not just one or
two states, but all of the states, to assess the effects of changingMedic-
aid policy. By comparing more broadly states that do and do not increase
Medicaid generosity over time, one can also control for correlated time
series trends. This is the approach taken by Currie and Gruber (1996a)
for the case of prenatal care utilization and infant outcomes, and Currie
and Gruber (1996b) for the case of child health care utilization and health
outcomes. In both cases, the authors use individual-level data onhealth
care utilization, either from the NationalLongitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) on pre-natal care utilization, or from the National Health Inter-
view Survey (NHIS) on child health care utilization. They combine this
with aggregate data on mortality outcomes from the Vital Statistics. In all
cases, the data are a time series ofnational cross-sections, providing
information on a number of states over time.
These data are used to run regressions of the form:
OUTCOME1 = a + f31X1 + /32ELIG + f336
+ f34T +
where OUTCOME is a measure of utilization or health outcome for
person i (or group i) in state j in year t, X is a set ofcontrol variables,
ELIG is an indicator of the eligibility of individual (or group) i for Medic-
aid, S andare a full set of state and year dummies, respectively.
The key variable in this model, ELIG, is imputed using the simulation
models described earlier. For models that are estimated on individual
data, the individual's characteristics are used as the basis for the imputa-
tion. For models that are estimated on aggregates, average eligibility in
that aggregate population is used as the key regressor; for example, for
state/year infant mortality, average eligibility in the state/year cell is
used.
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These OLS estimates, however, are subject to three sources of bias.
The first is omitted variables bias. It is difficult to control for all of the
individual determinants of eligibility which might be correlated with
utilization or health outcomes; moreover, differences in the financial
circumstances of particular places and times (e.g., a recession in a par-
ticular state) might be correlated with both eligibility and the outcome
variables of interest (utilization or health). The second is endogeneity: a
sick child may cause lower parental income (if a parent is forced to leave
work to care for the child, for example), leading to a spurious positive
correlation between Medicaid eligibifity and utilization. Finally, there
may be substantial measurement error in the eligibility indicator, given
the limitations of standard survey data sets (e.g., the reporting of only
annual income instead of the monthly income used by program adminis-
trators to assess eligibility).
A solution to all three of these problems is to find an instrument which
is correlated with individual eligibility for Medicaid, but not otherwise
correlated with the outcome variables of interest. A natural instrument
which meets these conditions is one which varies only with the legisla-
tive environment in the state and year in which the individual lives. To
create such an instrument, which they label "simulated eligibility,"
Currie and Gruber first select a national random sample of children of
each age and of women of child-bearing age in each year. They then
assign that same sample to each state in that year and use the eligibility
program described earlier to compute average state level eligibifity mea-
sures for this sample. This measure can be thought of as a convenient
parameterization of legislative differences affecting children in different
state, year, and age groupsa natural way to summarize the generosity
of state Medicaid policy as it affects each group is in terms of the effect it
would have on a given, nationally representative population.16
This instrumental variables strategy addresses the econometric difficul-
ties noted above. First, by using instruments that are arguably exoge-
nous to utilization or health, they purge the model of endogeneity bias.
Second, by using the fraction of the nationally representative population
eligible in each woman or child's state/year or state/year/age group, they
abstract from any individual-level omitted variables correlated with both
eligibility and outcomes. Third, to the extent that the measurement error
in the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the indi-
vidual eligibility measure, they also surmount the measurement error
16It is also the national analog to the state-level prepost analyses described above, which
also use only legislative variation. But this provides a means of scaling the differential
importance of the law changes across different states.192Gruber
problem. Finally, by using a national random sample to construct the in-
strument, they purge it of the effects of state and year-specificeconomic
conditions that might be correlated with both eligibility and utilization.17
4.4 Combining the StatesUtilization Results
The results of this approach are summarized in Table 6. For pregnant
women, Currie and Gruber (1996a) estimatemodels for the 1979-1992
period; for children, Currie and Gruber (1996b) estimate models for
1984-1992. The first panel shows the effect on utilization of being made
eligible for Medicaid, both in absolute (percentage point) terms and in
percentage terms (as a fraction of the baseline utilization rate in the
sample of eligibles).
The measure of utilization for pregnant women is whether these
women delayed their prenatal care untilafter the first trimester of preg-
nancy. In fact, in contrast to the pre-poststudies described earlier, there
is a large improvement in prenatal care utilization associated with Medic-
aid eligibility. Making someone eligible for Medicaid lowers the odds
that they delay prenatal care by almost 50 percentage points, which is
essentially a 100% reduction in the odds of delaying care. Thus, these
NLSY data suggest that women made eligible for Medicaid did increase
their usage of prenatal care in the direction recommended by the medi-
cal literature.
The effect of Medicaid on utilization of children, estimated in Currie
and Gruber (1996b), is summarized in the next three rows. Once again,
there is a sizeable effect of Medicaid on use of preventive care: being
made eligible for Medicaid is associated with a drop of almost 10% in the
probability of going without a visit for over a year; this is almost one-half
of the baseline probability of going without a visit. Their other measures
of health care utilization for children are less explicitly preventative.
There is a smaller rise in the probability of having a visit in the last two
weeks, and a significant and sizeable rise in the probability of having a
17There are two remaining potential problems with this approach. The first is that Medic-
aid policy itself may be correlated with differences in the outcome variables; for example,
rich states may have both more generous Medicaid policy and more medical utilization or
better health. Currie and Gruber deal with this problem by including a full set of dummy
variables for state, year, and (for children) each single year of age. The second, and related,
problem is that these Medicaid expansions may have themselves been endogenous re-
sponses by state legislators to perceived problems with medical care access or outcomes.
But this "endogenous legislation" scenario is unlikely to be very problematic in this context
since much of the permanent variation in eligibility is coming from federal mandates on
states of differing initial eligibility generosity, rather than state-specific expansions beyond
the federal mandates. As Cutler and Gruber (1996a) note, 90% of the children and 70% of
the pregnant women made eligible between 1987 and 1992 qualified for Medicaid under
federally-imposed minimum guidelines.Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children193
TABLE 6
Utilization and Health Effects of Medicaid ExpansionsSumma,y
Utilization (effects of being made eligible)
Health (effects of 10% eligibility rise)
Low birthweight 0.043 0.63%
Infant mortality 0.030 2.8%
Child mortality 0.013 3.4%
Cost per life saved
Infant life $1,026,000
Child life $1,610,000
Notes: First panel shows effects of being made eligible for Medicaid on utilization; percentage effectsare
as a share of baseline utilization rates in the eligible population. Second panel shows effects of a 10%
eligibility rise, both in percentage point terms and as a share of baseline incidence. Finalrow in each
panel shows implied cost per life saved. From Currie and Gruber (1996a,b).
hospital visit; the estimate implies that being made eligible for Medicaid
doubles the odds of a hospital visit in the previousyear.
One interesting feature of the expansions is their effect not onlyon
mean utilization but also on the distribution of utilization. Currie and
Gruber (1996b) and Currie (1996) explore the differential impact of the
expansions by race, education, and immigrant status. In allcases there
are some equalization impacts, with the utilization effects being particu-
larly large for blacks, low education groups, and immigrants.
4.5 Combining the StatesHealth Outcomes Results
The remainder of Table 6 investigates effects on health outcomes. The
figures in the first column are the absolute (percentage point) effects ofa
10% rise in eligibility. The second column is the percentage effect. For
infants, there is a significant and sizeable reduction in infant mortality
Absolute effects Percentage effects
Delay prenatal care beyond
first trimester
46.6 100%
No doctor's visit last year for
child
9.55 49%
Visit in last two weeks for
child
4.85 42%
Hospital use last year for
child
3.96 82%194Gruber
from the overall eligibility changes. For each 10 percentage pointrise in
eligibility, this estimate implies that infant mortality fellby 0.03 percent-
age points. The mean infant mortalityrate over this period is 1.06 per-
centage points. Thus, the 30 percentage pointrise in eligibility that took
place between 1979 and 1992 was associated with a 8.5%decline in the
infant mortality rate. There is a smaller and marginallysignificant effect
on low birthweight.
In Currie and Gruber (1996a), the authors go on to draw adistinction
between two types of Medicaid policies during the1979-1992 period:
"targeted" eligibility changes, which were addressed to verylow income
populations including AFDC recipients; and "broad" changes,which
were addressed to somewhathigher income groups. The targeted
changes consist of changes in AFDC eligibility, aswell as provisions
which expanded eligibility to low income women regardlessof family
structure; these were the source of eligibilitychanges before 1987. The
broad changes are the income expansions whichdominated the second
era, 1987-1992. As that paperhighlights, these different types of policies
affected quite different populations; in particular, the personscovered
by broad expansions had higher incomes and were morelikely to be
privately insured. As a result, one might expect thatthe policies would
have different effects on utilization and health outcomes.
The authors then note that there were in fact quitedifferent effects on
outcomes from these two types of policies.There were very sizeable
effects of the targeted expansions on mortality, whileonly insignificant
effect of broad expansions: a 30 percentage point increasein targeted
eligibility would have been associated with a 11.5% declinein infant
mortality, compared to a 2.9% decline under the broad policychanges.
There is also a very sizeable reduction in the incidenceof low birth-
weight associated with the targeted expansions (7.8% for a 30percent-
age point eligibility increase),but there is no effect on low birthweight
from the broad expansions.18 Currie and Gruber (1996a)conjecture that
the primary source of difference of these effects wasthe much lower
takeup of the broad expansions than the targeted expansions;they find
that takeup was three times higher for the former typesof policies.
Medicaid reduces the mortality of older children as well. Theauthors
find that for every 10 percentage point increase in the fractionof children
eligible for Medicaid, mortality drops by 0.013 percentage points;the
15.1 percentage point rise in eligibility between 1984 and 1992 isthere-
fore estimated to have decreased child mortality by 5.1%.
18Indeed, the increase in prenatal care utilization documented at the topof Table 6 arose
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A natural means of evaluating these findings is to consider the costto
the Medicaid program per life saved. This is calculated by modeling
administrative spending for each state/year on the Medicaidprogram as
a function of changes in eligibility, and comparing these cost changes to
any outcome improvements. For infants, the cost is roughly $1 million; in
fact, when Currie and Gruber once again disaggregate into the targeted
and broad policy changes, they find that the cost under the targeted
changed ($840,000) was much lower than under the broad expansions($4
million). For children, the cost per life saved is $1.6 million.
These figures for the cost of saving an infant life are quite high, given
the common perception in the health community that prenatalcare is a
cost effective intervention. Indeed, figures given in the Institute of Medi-
cine (TOM) report (1985) suggest that targeting improved prenatalcare to
high-risk women would cost $113,000 per life saved. In fact, the belief
that infant lives could be saved at reasonable costwas one of the driving
forces behind the adoption of the Medicaid expansions.
There are two possible explanations for this high cost of saving lives.
First, the higher figures in Table 6 may reflect the fact that improved
prenatal care under the Medicaid program has not been narrowlytar-
geted to high-risk women. If prenatal care designed to reduce preterm
delivery was delivered not only to women identifiedas high risk, but to
all pregnant women, the TOM report implies that the cost of savinga life
would rise to $1.06 million, a figure that is in line with the estimatedcost
of the targeted expansions.
Another reason for the unexpectedly high costsmay be increased use
of procedures for childbirth, for a given level of fetal health. Currie and
Gruber (1996a) draw an important distinction between individualvs.
hospital takeup. While use of prenatal care and other physician services
is a function of individual takeup decisions, the use of expensive in-
patient hospital services reflects decisions made by both individuals
and hospitals. Hospitals have strong incentives to ensure that eligible
women who arrive at the hospital to deliver are enrolled in the Medicaid
program, since hospitals are required to treat any patient who comes to
them for emergency care and are specifically prohibited from turning
away women in labor if they participate in Medicaid (U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment, 1987). Uncompensated charges to hospitals
amounted to $15 billion in 1989 (Gruber, 1994a), and childbirthwas the
single largest component, accounting for 17.4% of these expenditures
(Saywell et al., 1989).
This incentive for hospitals to sign up otherwise uninsured eligibles
has always been present, but the incentive became greater with the
Medicaid expansions, since they affected so many women. Indeed, the196Gruber
U.S. General Accounting Office (1994) reports that in recent years many
hospitals have established offices, or contracted with private firms, in
order to help Medicaid-eligible patients navigate the often tortuouspath
towards claiming benefits. Thus, even in the face of limited individual
takeup, the expansions may have nonetheless beenresponsible for a
large increase in the number of births financed by theMedicaid program
through hospital takeup decisions.
Moreover, once enrolled in Medicaid at the hospital, women may
receive much more expensive services than theiruninsured counter-
parts. Evidence from particular procedures with a highlevel of physician
discretion in Hadley et al. (1991) and Wenneker et al. (1990) showsthat
insured patients receive more intensive hospital treatment than unin-
sured patients along a number of margins. Thus, hospital takeupcould
readily result in increased Medicaid costs through shifts in the treatment
intensity of newly eligible mothers.
This hypothesis is investigated further in Currie and Gruber (1996c)
for the Medicaid expansions over the 1989-92 period. They useinforma-
tion from birth certificate data on utilization of obstetricprocedures dur-
ing childbirth, such as fetal monitoring and cesarean sectiondelivery.
They divide the population of women into two groups: teenmothers
and high school dropouts ("low education") and all others ("higheduca-
tion"). They note that the extent of takeup and crowdout arelikely to be
quite different for these two groups, due to the increasedfamiliarity
with public assistance and the lower private insurance coverageof the
former group. Indeed, when Medicaid and private coverage aremod-
elled as a function of Medicaid eligibility for these two groups, there is
80% takeup of Medicaid with little crowdout for the loweducation
group, and only 50% takeup withextensive crowdout for the higher
education group. But they also note that even if there is little net increase
in insurance coverage for other mothers, this does not meanthat there is
no effect on their procedure use.Medicaid reimburses hospitals at a
much lower level than do most private insurance plans. Thus,crowdout
represents a shift from more to less generous insurance coveragefor
women, which may impact on theirprocedure use even as their overall
insurance coverage status doesn't change.
Currie and Gruber (1996c) employ the same type of methodology
described above, but extend the approach to consider separate demo-
graphic groups within each state/year cell, allowing them to pursue the
low education versus all other split, as described above. Infact, they do
find sizeable and significant positive effects of eligibility for Medicaid on
the treatment of childbirth for the lower education group; thereis aHealth Insurance for Poor Women and Children197
uniform increase in the likelihood that women receive each of the proce-
dures documented on birth certificates.19 The estimates imply that the
30% rise in eligibility increased the rate of fetal monitoring or cesarean
section delivery by 7.5%.
For the other mothers, however, there is exactly the opposite effect: a
significant reduction in the use of three of the four obstetrical procedures
studied, and no effect on the other two. Overall, in fact, procedure use
was basically unchanged in every case. That is, while Medicaid costs
were rising substantially, social costs of treatment were unchanged:
women were obtaining the same treatment as before on average, with an
equalizing trend towards more intensive treatment for low education
groups and less intensive treatment for higher education groups.
4.6 Supply-Side Policies
The discussion thus far has focused on policies which increase the
demand for medical care. But for a number of reasons it may be
supply-side policies which are more effective. As noted above, there is
a shortage of physicians willing to serve the Medicaid population. This
suggests that increased demand for services generated by expansions
of the Medicaid program could go largely unmet, undercutting any
potential gains.
One natural supply-side tool is Medicaid fee policy. The low fees paid
by state Medicaid programs represent a major potential deterrent to
physician willingness to see Medicaid patients. Holahan (1991) reports
that the ratio of Medicaid fees to private fees was approximately 0.5 for
most procedures surveyed, and 0.56 for total obstetrical care with vagi-
nal delivery. And the Physician Payment Review Commission (1991)
found that 38 states identified low fees as the major cause of low physi-
cian participation rates. A large body of research suggests that increasing
the ratio of Medicaid fees relative to private sector fees will increase
physician participation in the Medicaid program (Hadley, 1979; Sloan,
Mitchell, and Cromwell, 1978; Held and Holahan, 1985; Mitchell, 1991).
Furthermore, Mitchell and Schurman (1984) and Adams (1994) find that
the participation of ob/gyns is especially responsive to fee increases.
Of course, higher physician fees are not guaranteed to improve out-
comes, due to the physician segregation noted above; on'y if fee in-
creases generate improvements in access in the places where Medicaid
19This echoes findings for the state of Massachusetts expansions in Haas et al. (1993b),
who showed that this eligibility increase was associated with a rise in the rate of cesarean
section delivery.198Gruber
recipients live will there be health improvements. Direct evidence on
this question is provided by Gruber, Adams, and Newhouse (1996), who
examined access to physicians after a large fee increase in Tennessee.
They find that there was a sizeable, but insignificant, fall in the average
distance of Medicaid patients from a physician.
Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995) examine directly the effect of the
relative fees paid to physicians by the Medicaid program on infant mor-
tality. They do so by building a state/year physician fee index for the
1979-1992 period. They then model state/year infant mortality as a func-
tion of lagged physician relative fees, including once again a full set of
state and year dummies. They also model both physician and total
spending as a function of the fee ratio. While raising fees will clearly
raise physician spending, there may be a countervailing "offset" effect
on other spending, if more physician participationshifts Medicaid pa-
tients from more expensive hospital outpatient departments and emer-
gency rooms to less expensive physicians' offices.2°
Their results are summarized in Table 7. In fact, there is a significant
negative, but small, effect of raising physician fees on infant mortality;
over the 1979-1992 period, doubling the physicianfee ratio would lower
infant mortality by 5.2%. An important question, however, is the effi-
ciency of this policy relative to the eligibility expansions. To investigate
this question, the authors also regress physician and total expenditures
on the fee ratio. Over the entire period, the costof each life saved in
terms of physician expenditures was $264,000. At the same time, how-
ever, raising physician fees was found to lowerhospital spending, per-
haps through inducing more efficient care. As a result, fee policy is
calculated to be a "free lunch": there is no cost increase but there is a
mortality reduction.
The next panel shows that this result is somewhat sensitive to the
time period chosen, however. If the sample is restricted to 1983-1992,
years for which the authors have higher quality fee data,the estimated
impact on infant mortality is larger. At the same time, however, the
authors find no offset in hospital costs, so that the cost per life saved is
$1.3 million. Nevertheless, this is only slightly larger than the cost of
eligibility expansions; it is also much lower than the cost of the broad
eligibility changes. Thus, physician fee policy may be a cost-effective
alternative to eligibility expansions, particularly when eligibility expan-
sions are hitting higher income populations who are being crowded out
of private insurance.
20Gruber, Adams, and Newhouse (1996) investigate this hypothesis directly; they find no
offset on the outpatient side, but they do find an offsetting large fall in inpatient spending.Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children199
TABLE 7
Physician Fees, Infant Outcomes, and Costs
1983-1992
Infant mortality -0.074 -7.0%
Cost per life saved $1,259,875
Notes: First panel shows results from 1979-1992 period; second panel shows results from 1983-1992
period. Absolute effects are percentage point effects from a 100% rise in the physician fee ratio. Percent-
age effects are these as a share of baseline mortality rate. Final row in each panel shows implied cost per
life saved. From Currie, Gruber, and Fischer (1995).
5. EFFECTS ON THE LABOR MARKET,
FAMILY STRUCTURE, AND REDISTRIBUTION
The discussion thus far has focused purely on the effects of Medicaid on
insurance coverage and on health. But, as has been highlighted in the
context of other social insurance programs, changes in programs such as
Medicaid can have a number of consequences, intended or otherwise,
elsewhere in the economy. The purpose of this section is to review the
evidence on three other consequences of the Medicaid expansions.
5.1 Medicaid, Labor Force Participation,
and Welfare Participation
One of the key motivations for health care reform is to reduce perceived
inefficiencies in the U.S. labor market arising from the fact that most
private insurance is linked to jobs. As a result of this phenomenon, it is
suggested that less healthy individuals may be afraid to leave jobs with
good private insurance policies, even if better job matches arise, due to
fear of losing their health insurance ("job lock").21 A similar phenome-
non existed for the AFDC program until the early 1980s. Low income
households can obtain fairly high quality insurance through the Medic-
aid program by being on AFDC. But, if they left the program, they
21See Madrian (1994) or Gruber and Madrian (1994) for evidence on the importance of job
lock in the U.S. economy.
Absolute effects
(per 100 births) Percentage effects
1979-1992
Infant mortality -0.056 -5.2%
Cost per life saved $0200Gruber
entered a low skilled labor market where few jobs offered health insur-
ance. Given the high cost of insurancein the non-group market, this
presented a large high cost to those women and children who were
otherwise inclined to leave the AFDC program. Following the analogy to
the private insurance market, the availability of insurance to low income
AFDC recipients provided a form of "welfare lock."
Given the existence of welfare lock, one potential advantageof
decoupling Medicaid from the AFDC program is that it could allow
individuals to leave AFDC without fear of losing insurance for their
children or for the costs of pregnancy. The result would be lower costsof
the AFDC program, as well as potential tax revenues from theearnings
of these new workers. The magnitude of the welfare lock problem, how-
ever, is uncertain: given the harsh job prospectsfor low income popula-
tions, even with health insurance they may be reticent toleave the
welfare rolls.
The magnitude of welfare lock has been the subject of a numberof
studies; see Gruber and Kubik (1995) for a review. Yelowitz (1995a)
provides the most convincing estimates of the extent of this phenome-
non by studying the effect of the decouplingof Medicaid from AFDC
through the Medicaid expansions. This allows him to compare families
that are otherwise identical, but who because of differential expansions
across states or age groups have differentnumbers of children covered
by health insurance. In this way, he controls for other characteristicsof
families, and identifies his model solely from legislative variation in
Medicaid eligibility.
Using this method on CPS data for 1988-1991, Yelowitz finds statisti-
cally significant and large effects of the Medicaid expansions on AFDC
participation. His estimates imply that the expansions result in a de-
crease in AFDC participation of 3.5%,and that increasing the income
cutoffs for Medicaid eligibility to children and pregnant mothers by an-
other 25% of the federal poverty line would decrease AFDC participation
by an additional 4.6%. Yelowitz then presents simulation resultsof ex-
tending medicaid coverage to all pregnant women and childrenwith
income below 185% of the poverty line in 1989; the decrease inAFDC
caseloads from this policy would save the government approximately
$410 per female-headed household per year.
5.2 Medicaid and Family Structure
A related form of distortion that arises from the traditional structureof
Medicaid is an incentive against marriage. That is, in order to qualify for
Medicaid, women had to be single mothers on the AFDC program.
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may not have health insurance to provide for the woman and her chil-
dren, this could result in the woman remaining single in order to qualify
for Medicaid. Yelowitz (1995b) once again uses the structure of the Med-
icaid expansions of the 1988-4991 period to explore this issue, byassess-
ing whether women who were made eligible for the insurance in the
state of marriage were then more likely to get married. He finds a small
but significant effect on marriage propensities from the Medicaidexpan-
sions through this channel.
5.3 Medicaid and Redistribution
A final effect of Medicaid policy to consider is redistribution, as is dis-
cussed in Cutler and Gruber (1996b). Even as Medicaid eligibility expan-
sions crowd out the private insurance coverage of those made eligible, it
also redistributes income towards that group. As documented in Table 4,
the expansion population is largely the working poordual parent fami-
lies with high school degrees but only moderate income. For thisgroup,
other public transfers are relatively low; on average, 83% of income for
this group is wage and salary income. Cutler and Gruber (1996b) esti-
mate that families who were crowded out of private insurance received
an average income transfer of $1,523.Relative to their mean income of
$18,302, this is an 8% increase in income, a non-trivial amount for this
working-poor population.
6. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The Medicaid program over the past decade provides a fascinatingexam-
ple of the benefits and limitations of government insurance policy. This
example is particularly interesting because there is a wealth of informa-
tion on the effects of Medicaid policy which can be gleaned from the rich
"natural experiment" provided by the Medicaid expansions. Tosumma-
rize the discussion in the text, there are five main lessons that have been
learned about the effects of Medicaid from studying the experience of
the expansions:
As Yelowitz notes, there is in fact a countervailing influence here. For some women who
were married to their husbands just to get health insurance, the increased income cutoffs
would allow them to divorce their husbands but maintain coverage. He is able to distin-
guish this effect from the marriage incentive effect described above by separating changes
in income cutoffs from changes in coverage of traditional families. He finds that both
effects are present, but that the positive marriage incentive effect predominates.
This calculation assumes that families receive all of the savings from choosing not to
purchase employer-provided health insurance (see Gruber (1994b) for evidence on this
point), and that for those family members who remain uninsured there are no net financial
consequences from dropping insurance.202Gruber
Dramatic expansions of Medicaid eligibility may only very loosely be
translated to increases in Medicaid coverage, due to limited takeup.
In fact, only 23% of children made eligible for the expansionstook up
coverage.
Part of the reason for low takeup is that many individuals who were
covered by the expansions already had private health insurance. In
fact, many of those who had private insurance dropped that insur-
ance to take up Medicaid: for every two personswho were added to
the Medicaid rolls by the expansions, one dropped private coverage.
Despite takeup problems, Medicaid was effective in increasing theutil-
ization of preventive care among both pregnant women andchildren.
Medicaid eligibility also was associated with reduced mortality
among children and newborns; for thelatter group, there were much
stronger effects of earlier more limited eligibffity changesthan of the
broader expansions. But these mortality improvements came at a
steep cost per life saved. For newborns, it appearsthat an equally or
possibly more cost effective alternative to eligibility expansionsis
increased provider reimbursement.
The Medicaid expansions also had three auxifiary effectsoutside of
the arena of insurance or health changesthey reducedAFDC partici-
pation, increased rates of marriage, and effected aredistribution to
the working poor.
This broad list of conclusions ifiustrates the difficulty ofdrawing sim-
ple conclusions about the effect of Medicaid eligibility.Nevertheless, the
literature summarized here offers two general lessons/directionsfor fu-
ture research.
6.1 Targeting Matters
A standard problem faced by all social insurance programs istargeting
their benefits to the groups in need. In the case of Medicaid policy,the
group in need are those low income personswho are otherwise unable
to obtain insurance in the private market. As aresult of the unobserv-
ability of this characteristic, Medicaid eligibility policy inducesboth
Type I errors (extending benefits to those who don'tneed them) and
Type II errors (not extending benefits to those who doneed them). The
former is exemplified by theof the population covered by the expan-
sions who had private insurance. The latter is exemplifiedby the 11% of
the population that is uninsured but still not eligible.
But, more importantly, the latter consists also ofindividuals who are
actually eligible, and who are in need of public coverage, but who do not
take up their benefits. Takeup here consists either of signing up atall, orHealth Insurance for Poor Women and Children203
of signing up appropriately. For example, even though most pregnant
women will be made aware of their Medicaid eligibility when they go to
the hospital to deliver their babies, the fact that they did not know
earlier, and did not use earlier prenatal care, is a lack of takeup. There
could be potential efficiency gains to the Medicaid program by shifting
dollars from the "crowded out" group to the group that is truly in need
but is either not eligible or does not (appropriately) take up.
Policy alternatives for addressing low takeup by needy groups are
relatively straightforward, and involve outreach to the population at
risk. Indeed, several states have adopted public relations campaigns
with themes such as "Baby Your Baby" (Utah) or "Baby Love" (North
Carolina) to accompany expansions in Medicaid eligibility. Buescher et
al. (1991) find that the North Carolina program had significant positive
effects on the utilization of prenatal care and on birth outcomes.
Minimizing crowdout without disqualifying needy applicants, how-
ever, is more difficult. There are several options here. The first is to
resort to the type of "ordeal" mechanisms described by Nichols and
Zeckhauser (1982) as a means of improving targeting. For example, a
waiting period could be imposed between when an individual loses
private coverage and when they become eligible for Medicaid, or indi-
viduals could be excluded from Medicaid coverage entirely if they are
offered but decline private coverage.24 This type of mechanism would be
hard to monitor, however, and it is possible that it could lead to even
higher levels of uninsurance, as individuals decide to forgo private cover-
age for the required waiting period.
An alternative would be to make Medicaid less attractive, without
removing its basic insurance properties. As noted above, currently Med-
icaid enrollees pay none of the costs of their care while those with
private insurance pay about one-third on average. Thus, moving to-
wards increased copayments and deductibles for Medicaid enrollees
would make it a much less attractive option, while maintaining its essen-
tial (catastrophic) insurance features, with basic immunization and pre-
ventative care visits covered. In theory, the program could even move to
the type of income-related copayment schedule advocated by Feldstein
(1971) and analyzed by Feldstein and Gruber (1995), where copayment
rates are high but they are limited as a share of income (for example, 10%
of income). This would allow Medicaid to expand even further up the
income distribution without as much crowdout, since it would not be
24 Indeed, this is exactly the structure of a recent subsidy program for the purchase of
private insurance in Minnesota: individuals must have been uninsured for 18 months or
more, and can not work at a job that offers health insurance.204Gruber
particularly attractive to higher income persons. At the same time,
supply-side restrictions could be introduced, making Medicaid more of a
"managed care" program along the lines of private insurance.These
restrictions will once again make the program less attractive relative to
private insurance, while maintaining its essential insurance features.
A more radical alternative here would be to forgo entirely the provi-
sion of public insurance, and to simply subsidize the purchase of private
insurance, with a sliding scale that offers high subsidies for very low
income persons but which declines as income rises. This approach
would provide subsidies to everyone in a given income range, but
would induce less distortion across types of insurance. However, given
the problems with the individual insurance market, this approach is not
guaranteed to have important impacts on private insurance coverage.
The evidence on the elasticity of response to private insurance subsidies
is mixed; see Gruber and Poterba (1996) for a review. Future research in
this area could usefully focus on the relative insurance impacts of public
insurance provision versus private insurance subsidization.
6.2 Evaluate Cost-Effectiveness
The success of public insurance policy cannot be measured solely by
its impacts on health; the costs of any health improvements must be
considered as well. In fact, the evidence reviewed above illustrates that
Medicaid eligibility expansions saved lives only at a very high cost ($1
million per infant life or $1.6 million per child life). Are these costs per
life saved high or low? There are several natural benchmarks to which
they can be compared.
The first is relative to the distribution of resources within the Medicaid
program, and in particular to supply-side interventions such ashigher
fees. As noted earlier, fee increases may be at least as cost effective as
increases in eligibffity in terms of improving health outcomes. And
lower reimbursement to hospitals for very expensive interventions may
have little impact on outcomes while substantially reducing costs. Per-
haps the most important direction for future research on Medicaid is to
distinguish the effect that different interventions have on the production
of health and on costs, in order to inform policy makers of their relative
efficacy.
Indeed, many state Medicaid programs have introduced reforms along these lines in
recent years. Another alternative for making Medicaid less attractive is to explicitly restrict
the package of services that would be covered, as was attempted by the Oregon Medicaid
program. This approach runs into many problems in practice, however, as particular
exclusions draw attention to perceived horizontal inequities in coverage (see Strosberg et
al. (1992) for a further discussion of the implications of the Oregon plan).Tengs et al. (1995)Life
saving interventions
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TABLE 8
The Value of a Life
Value
Source Type of risk (millions of $)
Manning et al. (1989) Willingness to pay 1.66
Viscusi (1993) Labor market risk of death 3-7
Compensating
differentials
Other tradeoffs outside of 4
labor market
Survey evidence 0.1-16




Flammability standard for 0
children's sleepwear,
size 0-6
Flammability standard for 3.4-12
children's sleepwear,
size 7-14
Flammability standard for 1126
children's clothing,
size 7-14
School bus safety 11.2-367
Note: Table reports estimates of the value of a life from sources cited in first column, according to
methods cited in second column.
A more difficult issue involves comparing the value of dollars devoted
to the Medicaid program to dollars spent elsewhere. On the one hand,
the figures in Table 6 and 7 are very large relative to other investments
society makes in children. For example, the $1.06 million per life saved
from the targeted expansions to pregnant women wouldpay for 260
child/years of elementary/secondary education, 312 family/years of
AFDC benefits for the typical 2-person family, or 353 child/years of Head
Start preschool.26
On the other hand, studies of the value of an adult life generally arrive
at figures that exceed our estimated cost of saving a life via Medicaid
policy. These studies are reviewed in Table 8. Manning et al. (1989)use
data from studies of willingness to pay for a small change in the probabil-
26Cost of education is average expenditures per student from U.S. Department of Educa-
tion (1991); AFDC costs are from the AFDC benefits data used in this paper; Head Start
costs come from Stewart (1992).206Gruber
ity of survival to estimate a value of life of $1.66million. Viscusi (1993)
summarizes studies based on compensatingdifferentials for risk of
death on the job and concludes that the most reliable estimates range
from $3 to $7 million per life saved. A similar estimate isobtained from
his most reliable study using non-labor market data.Survey evidence on
the value of a life, however, obtains a very wide bound onvalue, rang-
ing from 0.1 to 16 million.
However, although the literature on compensatingdifferentials sug-
gests that the value of a life falls with age sincefewer years of life are
saved for older workers (Moore and Viscusi, 1988), thevalue of a
newborn life may be much less than that of a prime-age adult because
investments in human capital have not yetbeen made. Also, the
compensating differentials literature implies that the value oflife rises
with income because higher income persons are willing to pay more
to save their lives (Evans and Viscusi, 1993).The impact of Medicaid
policy, and particularly of the targeted policy changes, isconcentrated
among low income populations. Hence, tovalue an infant life using
estimates derived from studies of compensating wagedifferentials,
one would have to somehow adjustboth for differences in human
capital and for differences in income levels. Whether theMedicaid
policy changes would appear cost-effective after theseadjustments
were made is unclear.
A second way to use the compensating differentialsframework would
involve viewing children as a consumption good and examiningthe
tradeoffs parents are willing to make in order to protect children,born
and unborn, from potential hazards such as dangerouschemicals. We
are unaware of any studies of thisissue.27
An alternative means of assessing cost effectiveness is to comparethe
cost of saving a life via Medicaid policy to the costsof saving a life via
other government interventions; if the governmentmandates that at least
$1.6 mfflion be spent to save newborns and childrenthrough other chan-
nels, then the expansions could be viewed as relativelycost-effective.
Tengs et al. (1995) review several alternative governmentinterventions
aimed directly at children, and find that most of them costsubstantially
more than $1.6 million, as Table 8shows. For example, child restraint
systems in cars cost $73,000 per life/year saved, or $5.3million for a child
with a 74.8-year life expectancy (the average for children bornin 1986).
Other interventions are much more expensive, some costingupwards of
Alternatively, if children are viewed as consumption goods, one could claim thatthe
value of a newborn was the cost of adoption or of hiring a surrogate mother,both of which
are much lower than the cost to Medicaid of saving aninfant (see Economist, 1988).Health Insurance for Poor Women and Children207
$1 billion per life saved. By this metric then, the Medicaid expansions
were fairly cost-effective.
There are two further complications to making this comparison.
First, the figures for the cost of saving a life do not value health
improvements short of mortality reductions. Mortality is a relatively
crude measure of health improvements; to the extent that Medicaid
coverage improves health status along other margins as well, this
raises further the cost effectiveness of the program. Second, as Currie
and Gruber (1996c) find, the social cost of the broad expansions to
pregnant women may have been much lower than the cost to the
Medicaid program, because some of the increased costs to Medicaid
represent reduced costs to private insurance. Thus, an appropriate
calculation of the net costs involves incorporation of the marginal dead-
weight loss from raising the funds through the public sector relative to
financing the expenses through private insurance. Finally,as Cutler
and Gruber (1996b) highlight, there is important implicit redistribution
coming through the Medicaid expansions. For example, considercom-
paring saving a life through Medicaid versus increasing educational
expenditures: as noted above, Medicaid redistributes resources toa
low income group which has traditionally not received manygovern-
ment transfers, whereas educational spending may largely transfer re-
sources to higher income groups.28
In measuring the value of increased Medicaid spending, one aspect to
consider which has not played a large role in debates thus far iscoverage
of other groups in the population. The primacy given to children and
pregnant women in health insurance policy-making may be warranted,
given the potential long-term benefits of low cost interventions early in
life (such as improved prenatal care or immunization). But covering
women of child-bearing age at all times, rather than just while pregnant,
may prove to be cost-effective policy. One reason for low utilization of
prenatal care among those made eligible for pregnancy coverage inre-
cent years is that women find out about their eligibility too late in their
pregnancies. This may not be the case if they are continuously covered.
Moreover, it may be that maintaining a constant high level of healthiness
is more important for the ultimate development of infants than is the
particular pattern of prenatal care.
These two issues may even be in conflict in comparing alternative Medicaid interven-
tions. For example, financial incentives to physicians to see Medicaid patients may be a
more cost effective means of saving lives than eligibility expansions, but it has less attrac-
tive distributional properties.208Gruber
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